An Elementary Proof of Private Random Number Generation from Bell
  Inequalities by Miller, Carl A.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
7.
06
59
7v
2 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
10
 M
ay
 20
18
An Elementary Proof of Private Random Number Generation
from Bell Inequalities
Carl A. Miller
National Institute of Standards and Technology, 100 Bureau Dr., Gaithersburg, MD 20899, USA
Joint Center for Quantum Information and Computer Science,
3100 Atlantic Bldg, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA
(Dated: May 11, 2018)
The field of device-independent quantum cryptography has seen enormous success in the past
several years, including security proofs for key distribution and random number generation that
account for arbitrary imperfections in the devices used. Full security proofs in the field so far are
long and technically deep. In this paper we show that the concept of the mirror adversary can be
used to simplify device-independent proofs. We give a short proof that any bipartite Bell violation
can be used to generate private random numbers. The proof is based on elementary techniques and
is self-contained.
Quantum cryptography is based on, among other phys-
ical principles, the concept of intrinsic randomness : cer-
tain quantum measurements are unpredictable, even to
an adversary who has complete information about the
protocol and the apparatus used. This intrinsic random-
ness allows a user to generate cryptographic keys that
are guaranteed to be secure without the need for compu-
tational assumptions.
Device-independent quantum cryptography is based
on a more specific observation: two or more devices
that exhibit superclassical probability correlations (when
blocked from communicating) must be making quantum
measurements, and therefore must be exhibiting random
behavior. This allows the generation of random numbers
even when the devices themselves are not trusted. This
idea has been used in multiple cryptographic contexts,
including randomness expansion and amplification [1, 2],
key distribution [3], and coin-flipping [4], and has been
realized in experiments [5, 6].
Despite the simplicity of the central idea, proofs for
device-independent quantum cryptography are challeng-
ing and took several years to develop. One of the central
challenges is proving that the random numbers generated
by a Bell experiment are secure even in the presence of
quantum side information. (This level of security is nec-
essary for quantum key distribution, and also for random
number generation if one wishes to use the random num-
bers as inputs to another quantum protocol.) While clas-
sical statistical arguments can be used to show that the
outputs of a Bell violation are unpredictable to a classi-
cal adversary (see, e.g., [7, 8]) these proofs do not carry
over to the case of quantum side information because of
the notion of information locking [9].
Known proofs of Bell randomness in the presence of
quantum side information have used tools that are spe-
cific to the context: [10, 11] uses reconstruction proper-
ties of quantum-proof randomness extractors, and [12–
16] are based on inductive arguments centered on the
quantum Renyi divergence function. Such proofs are long
and mathematically complex. The recent paper [15] pro-
vides an easily adaptable framework for proving new re-
sults on randomness generation, but it is based on the
entropy accumulation theorem [14], the proof of which is
technically deep.
The goal of the current paper is to provide a compact
security proof of Bell randomness in the presence of quan-
tum side information. The proof is based on the mirror
adversary approach, which uses the fact that an adver-
sary who simply “mirrors” the behavior of the devices
is almost as good as an optimal adversary. The mirror
adversary can be considered as a participant in a larger
repeated Bell experiment. This idea was discussed in a
previous paper by the author [17], and is a reframing of
the commonly used idea of pretty good measurements
(see expression (7) below).
In the current paper the mirror adversary technique
is combined with techniques drawn from other sources
[18, 19] to give a compact proof of private random number
generation from Bell experiments. (The paper does not
attempt to maximize the performance parameters, which
are suboptimal compared to [10–16].) The proof is self-
contained, with material from other sources reproved as
needed. The only assertions taken for granted in the
proof are Azuma’s inequality (see Theorem 7.2.1 in [20])
and Holder’s inequality (see Corollary IV.2.6 in [21]).
The main result is the following (see Theorem 7).
Theorem 1 (Informal) Suppose that two untrusted de-
vices exhibit a Bell violation of δ > 0 over N rounds.
Then, Ω(Nδ6) private random bits can be extracted from
the outputs of the devices in polynomial time, using O(N)
bits of public randomness (that is, randomness known to
the adversary but not the devices). The resulting private
bits are secure against quantum side information.
The mirror adversary technique is a general way of
reducing security questions in the quantum context to
classical statistical statements, and it is potentially use-
ful for any cryptographic task in which security must be
proved against a passive entangled adversary.
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2Preliminaries. Throughout the paper, a register Z
is a finite-dimensional Hilbert space with a fixed or-
thonormal basis (the elements of which we call basic
states). A state φ of Z is a density operator on Z. Let
|Z| = dim(Z). If Z = Z1⊗Z2 (which we may abbreviate
as Z = Z1Z2) we will write φ
Z1 for TrZ2φ. If Z2 is a
register and e is a basic state of Z2, then φ
Z1
e denotes
TrZ2 [φ(IZ1 ⊗|e〉 〈e|)]. As a convenience, if X is an opera-
tor on Z and Y is an operator on Z1, then the expression
XY means X(Y ⊗ IZ2) and the expression Y X means
(Y ⊗ IZ2 )X .
We give a formalism for nonlocal games and the quan-
tum strategies used in such games. We begin by formal-
izing measurements. An (N -fold) measurement strategy
on a register Q is a family of positive operator-valued
measures on Q of the form{{
F tu
}
t∈T N
}
u∈UN
, (1)
where T and U are finite sets. Such a strategy is sequen-
tial if for any t1, . . . , ti ∈ T and u ∈ UN , the operator
F t1···tiu :=
∑
ti+1···tn
F t1···titi+1···tnu (2)
is independent of the values of ut+1 · · ·un. (In such a
case we can simply write F t1···tiu1···ui for F
t1···ti
u
.) Sequential
measurements model the behavior of a quantum player
who receives inputs u1, . . . , uN and produces outputs
t1, . . . , tN in sequence. In such a case, for any u1, . . . , ui
and t1, . . . , ti for which F
t1···ti
u1···ui 6= 0, there is a 1-fold mea-
surement strategy on Q given by{{(
F t1···tiu1···ui
)−1/2
F
t1···ti+1
u1···ui+1
(
F t1···tiu1···ui
)−1/2}
ti+1
}
ui+1
,
which defines the behavior of the player on the (i + 1)st
round conditioned on the inputs sequence u1, . . . , ui and
output sequence t1, . . . , ti for the first i rounds. We call
these the conditional measurement strategies induced by
{{F tu}t}u.
An r-player nonlocal game H consists of the following
data: (1) a finite set of input strings I = I1 × · · · × Ir
and a finite set of outputs strings O = O1 × · · · × Or
(2) a probability distribution p on I, and (3) a scoring
function L : I × O → R. For such a game, HN denotes
the N -fold direct product of H (i.e., the game played N
times in parallel, with independently chosen inputs, and
where the score is the sum of scores achieved on each of
the N copies of the game).
A measurement strategy for H on a register Q is a
measurement strategy on Q of the form {{F oi }o∈O}i∈I .
Such a strategy is n-partite if Q = Q1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Qn and
F oi = F
o1
1,i1
⊗ · · · ⊗ F onn,in (3)
where {{F okk,ik}ok∈Ok}ik∈Ik are measurement strategies
on Qk for k = 1, 2, . . . , n. A sequential measurement
strategy for the game HN is an n-partite sequential mea-
surement strategy if all of its conditional strategies are
n-partite. (This class of strategies models the behavior
of players who must play the different rounds of the game
in sequence, and who can communicate in between but
not during rounds.)
If F is a strategy on a register Q, and φ is a state of Q,
then we refer to the pair (F, φ) simply as a (quantum)
strategy for Q. Let ω(H) denote the supremum of the
expected score at G among all quantum strategies.
Proposition 2 Let H be an r-player nonlocal game
whose scoring function has range [−K,K], and let (F, φ)
be an n-partite sequential measurement strategy for HN .
Then, the probability that the score achieved by (F, φ)
exceeds (ω(H) + δ)N is no more than
e−Nδ
2/8K2 . (4)
Proof. For each i = 1, 2, . . . , N , letWi denote the score
achieved on the ith round, and let
W i = E[Wi | Wi−1 · · ·W1]. (5)
The sequence
(∑i
j=1(Wi −W i)
)N
i=1
forms a Martin-
gale, and thus by Azuma’s inequality (noting that∣∣Wi −W i∣∣ ≤ 2K) the probability that
N∑
i=1
(Wi −W i) > δN (6)
is upper bounded by (4). Since W i ≤ w(H), the desired
result follows. 
For convenience, we also make the following definition.
A Bell game is a game G for which we make the following
assumptions:
1. The input alphabets and output alphabets are all
equal to {0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1} for some n. (We call n
the “alphabet size.”)
2. The input distribution is uniform.
3. The range of the scoring function is [−1, 1].
4. The optimal classical score is 0.
Note that any Bell inequality can be put into this form
(by an appropriate affine transformation of the scoring
function).
The mirror adversary. If α is a quantum-classical
state of a registerQC (that is, a state of the form
∑
c αc⊗|c〉 〈c|) then the pretty good measurement induced by α
on Q is the C-valued measurement given by
{(αQ)−1/2αQc (αQ)−1/2}c∈C . (7)
This is a common construction. In the cryptographic
context it can be thought of as a “pretty good” attempt
by an adversary to use to Q to guess C.
Let ρ be a state of the register Q. Then, we can con-
struct a purification for ρ as follows: let Q′ be an isomor-
phic copy of Q, let Φ =
∑
e e⊗e ∈ Q⊗Q′, where the sum
3Parameters:
- A 2-player Bell game G with alphabet size n.
- A real number δ > 0 (the degree of Bell violation).
- Positive integers N (the number of rounds), and J
(the output size).
1. A pure tripartite state ABE is prepared by Eve, and
with A possessed by Alice, B possessed by Bob, and
E possessed by Eve.
2. The referee generates uniformly random numbers
x1, y1 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, gives them as input to Alice
and Bob, respectively, who return outputs s1, t1.
This is repeated (N − 1) times to obtain input
sequences x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN and output se-
quences s1, . . . , sN , t1, . . . , tN .
3. The referee checks whether the average score ex-
ceeds δ. If not, the protocol is aborted.
4. Let D be a 2-universal hash family from SN to FJ2
with |D| ≤ 4
∣
∣SN
∣
∣
2
(see subsection A 3 in the ap-
pendix). The referee chooses F ∈ D at random and
outputs F (s).
FIG. 1. The random number generation protocol.
is over all basic states of Q. Let ρˆ denote the projector
onto the one-dimensional subspace of Q⊗Q′ spanned by
(
√
ρ ⊗ IQ′)Φ. We call ρˆ the canonical purification of ρ.
Note that TrQ′ ρˆ = ρ while TrQρˆ = ρ
⊤ = ρ.
The following proposition implies that a “pretty good”
adversary in a Bell experiment simply mirrors the de-
vice’s measurements. (As a consequence, if the devices’
measurement were sequential, so are the adversary’s.)
Proposition 3 Let ρ be a state of a register Q, and let ρˆ
be the canonical purification of ρ (a state of the registers
QQ′). Let α be the state QC that arises from ρˆ by per-
forming a measurement {Rc}c∈C on Q′ and storing the
result in a register C. Then, the pretty good measurement
induced by α on Q is isomorphic to {Rc}c∈C.
Proof. The state α is given by the expression α =∑
c |c〉 〈c| ⊗
√
ρRc
√
ρ, and αQ = ρ. The pretty good
measurement induced by α on Q is thus isomorphic to
{ρ−1/2√ρRc√ρρ−1/2} = {Rc}. 
The next proposition, which is a modification of a re-
sult from [18], expresses the fact that if the pretty good
measurement yields (almost) no information about a clas-
sical register C, then that register must be (almost) uni-
formly random. We state a version that will be useful in
the device-independent context. Let Z denote a classical
register with two basic states, abort and succ.
Proposition 4 Let α be a state of a tripartite register
QCZ which is classical on CZ. Let {Rz} and {Rcz}
denote the pretty good measurements on Q:
Rcz = (α
Q)−1/2αQcz(α
Q)−1/2, (8)
Rz = (α
Q)−1/2αQz (α
Q)−1/2. (9)
Let G be a Bell game and (ρ,M,N) a strategy for G.
1. The register AB is prepared in state ρ. For i =
1, 2, . . . , n, Alice applies the measurement {Msi } to
A and records the result in a classical register Si.
2. Referee gives Alice and Bob randomly chosen inputs
x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, respectively.
3. Alice returns the register Sx. Bob measures B with
{N ty}t and reports the result.
FIG. 2. A process in which Alice is forced to behave classi-
cally.
Let f = Tr[αQsuccRsucc] and
f ′ =
∑
c
Tr[αQc,succRc,succ]. (10)
Then,
∥∥αQCsucc − αQsucc ⊗ UC∥∥1 ≤
√
f ′ |C| − f, (11)
where UC denotes the completely mixed state on C.
The proof is given in the appendix. Note that the
quantity f is the probability of the event that both Z =
succ and that an adversary who uses the pretty good
measurement will guess that Z = succ. The quantity
f ′ is the probability that the previous event holds and
the adversary guesses C. If f ′ = f/ |C| (that is, if the
adversary’s guess at C is no better than random) then
the term on the right side of (11) is equal to zero.
Guessing games. The following is roughly the same
as the construction of immunization games in [19]. Let
G = ((X ,Y), (S, T ), p, L) be a 2-player Bell game with
alphabet size n, and let K > 0. Then we define a new
3-player game GK as follows.
1. The input alphabets for the three players are X ,Y
and X ×Y, respectively, and the output alphabets
are S, T and S, respectively.
2. The probability distribution is uniform on triples
of the form (x, y, (x, y)), with x ∈ X , y ∈ Y.
3. The score assigned to an input triple (x, y, (x, y))
and output triple (s, t, s′) is L(x, y, s, t) if s = s′,
and is (−K) otherwise.
Proposition 5 For any Bell game G with alphabet size
n, ω(GK) ≤ 4n/
√
K.
Our proof is similar to [19]. We will use the process
described in Figure 2.
Proof. Let Y = (Γ,M,N,P) be a quantum strategy
for GK on a space A⊗B⊗E. Let ρ = ΓAB, and for any
x ∈ X , s ∈ S, let ρsx denote the subnormalized state of
AB induced by the measurement P sxy on E.
For any x, y, the probability that Alice’s and Eve’s out-
puts will disagree when the input is (x, y, (x, y)) is given
4by the quantity (1−∑sTr(M sxρsx)), which we denote by
δx. Note that if the average failure probability
∑
x δx/n
exceeds 1/K, then (since a score of −K is awarded when
Eve fails to guess Alice’s output) the score achieved by
Y obviously cannot exceed 0. So, we will assume for the
remainder of the proof that
∑
x δx/n ≤ 1/K.
By Proposition 8 in the appendix, we have∥∥∥∥∥
∑
s
M sxρM
s
x − ρ
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 4
√
δx (12)
for any x, y. Therefore if we let Wx denote the com-
pletely positive trace-preserving map on A given by
X 7→ ∑sM sxXM sx, we obtain the following distance in-
equalities for the states obtained by applying the maps
Wx sequentially:
‖WiWi−1 · · ·W1(ρ)− ρ‖1 (13)
≤
i∑
j=1
‖WiWi−1 · · ·Wj(ρ)−Wi−1Wi−2 · · ·Wj+1(ρ)‖1
≤
i∑
j=1
‖Wj(ρ)− ρ‖1 ≤
i∑
j=1
4
√
δj . (14)
(Here we have used the fact that ‖·‖1 is non-increasing
under quantum processes.)
Observe that in the process in Figure 2, the state that
Alice and Bob measure at step 3 is separable, and so their
expected score cannot exceed 0. On the other hand, by
(14), the state of the registerAB is never more than trace
distance
∑n
j=1 4
√
δj from the original state ρ, and so the
expected score achieved in Figure 2 also cannot be less
than ω(G, Y )−∑nj=1 4√δj . Thus we have
ω(G, Y ) ≤
n∑
j=1
4
√
δj (15)
which implies ω(G, Y ) ≤ 4√n
√∑n
j=1 δj . Since we have
assumed
∑
x δx ≤ n/K, this yields the desired result. 
Security proof. We will now prove the security of
the protocol in Figure 1 by considering the “mirrored”
version of the protocol as shown in Figure 3.
Proposition 6 For the process in Figure 3, let succ
and succ′ denote the events that the referee and the ad-
versary consider the protocol to have succeeded (respec-
tively). Then,
P((S = S′) ∧ succ ∧ succ′) ≤ e−Ω(Nδ6/n4). (16)
Proof. For any K ≥ 1, if the three events on the left
side of (16) all occur, then Alice and Bob and the adver-
sary have achieved an average score of at least δ at the
repeated game (GK)
N using a sequential tripartite strat-
egy. By Propositions 2 and 5, the probability of such a
score is no more than
exp(−N(δ − 4n/
√
K)2/8K2). (17)
Parameters:
- A 2-player Bell game G with alphabet size n.
- A real constant δ > 0 and positive integers N, J .
- A bipartite state Σ of registers AB.
1. Registers ABA′B′ are prepared in the canonical pu-
rification of the state Σ.
2. The referee prepares n-valued registers
X1, . . . , XN , X
′
1, . . . , X
′
NY1, . . . , YN , Y
′
1 , . . . , Y
′
N ,
and D-valued registers F, F ′ (where D denotes the
hash family from step 4 in Figure 1) so that for
each register Z the corresponding primed register
Z′ is in a Bell state with Z. The referee gives all
primed registers to the adversary.
3. The referee measures the registers X,Y in the stan-
dard bases to obtain x1, . . . , xN and y1, . . . , yN ,
which are given sequentially to Alice and Bob who
return outputs s1, . . . , sN , t1, . . . , tN .
4. The referee checks whether the average score ex-
ceeds δ. If not, the referee considers the protocol
aborted. If so, the referee measures F , and then
computes V := F (S).
5. The adversary carries out step 3 above herself, us-
ing the registers A′, B′,X′,Y′ and the conjugates of
the measurements used by Alice and Bob, to obtain
outputs S′,T′. If the average score at G is less than
δ, the adversary considers the protocol aborted. If
not, she computes V′ := F ′(S′).
FIG. 3. The mirrored random number generation protocol.
Setting K = (8n/δ)2 yields the desired result. 
Note that the event ((V = V′) ∧ succ ∧ succ′) can
occur only if either ((S = S′) ∧ succ ∧ succ′) occurs,
or if ((S 6= S′) ∧ succ ∧ succ′) occurs but nonetheless
F (S) = F (S′). Since F is chosen from a 2-universal hash
family, we have
P((V = V′ ∧ succ ∧ succ′)
≤ e−Ω(Nδ6/n4) + 2−JP(succ ∧ succ′).
By Proposition 3, the register V′ in Figure 3 is precisely
the result of the adversary using a pretty good measure-
ment in Figure 1 in order to guess V. Thus by Propo-
sition 4 (with C = V and Q = XYFE), we obtain the
following.
Theorem 7 Let ρ denote the final state of the registers
in Figure 1. Then,
∥∥ρVXYFEsucc − UV ⊗ ρXYFEsucc ∥∥1 ≤ 2J/2−Ω(Nδ6/n4). 
Note that if we fix δ, n and let J = ⌊cN⌋ for some
sufficiently small c > 0, the expression on the right of the
inequality above vanishes exponentially. Thus random
number generation with a linear rate and negligible error
term is achieved.
5Appendix A: Supplementary Proofs
1. The proof of Proposition 4
We follow the proof of Lemma 4 in [18]. Let X = αQ
and Y = αQCsucc. Note that Tr(X) = 1, and therefore∥∥X1/d∥∥
d
= 1 for any d. By Holder’s inequality, we have
the following.
∥∥Y − Y Q ⊗ UC∥∥1
≤
∥∥∥X1/4 ⊗ IC
∥∥∥
4
∥∥∥X−1/4(Y − Y Q ⊗ UC)X−1/4
∥∥∥
2
·
∥∥∥X1/4 ⊗ IC
∥∥∥
4
= |C|1/4 · Tr
[(
X−1/4(Y − Y Q ⊗ UC)X−1/4
)2]1/2
|C|1/4
= |C|1/2
{
Tr
[(
X−1/4Y X−1/4
)2]
−2Tr
[
X−1/2Y X−1/2(Y Q ⊗ UC)X−1/4
]
+Tr
[(
X−1/4(Y Q ⊗ UC)X−1/4
)2]}1/2
= |C|1/2
{
Tr
[(
X−1/4Y X−1/4
)2]
− 1|C|Tr
[(
X−1/4(Y Q)X−1/4
)2]}1/2
,
where we have used the fact that Tr[(Y Q ⊗ UC)Z] =
1
|C|Tr[Y
QZQ] for any Hermitian operator Z on QC. By
substitution we obtain the desired result.
2. Predictable measurements
We reprove a result used by other authors [19, 22]. The
following proposition asserts that if a quantum-classical
state of a register QC is such that C can be accurately
guessed from a measurement on Q, then that same mea-
surement does not disturb the state by much.
Proposition 8 Let QC be a classical quantum register
in state α, and let {P c}c be a projective measurement on
Q whose outcome agrees with C with probability 1 − δ.
Then,
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
c∈C
P cαP c − α
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 4
√
δ. (A1)
Proof. Our proof is similar to that of [22], Lemma I.4.
First suppose that α is concentrated on a single basic
state of C, i.e., Pα(C = z) = 1 for some z. Then,
Tr((P z)α) = 1− δ,
and therefore
‖P zαP z − α‖1
=
∥∥(P z)⊥αP z + (P z)α(P z)⊥ + (P z)α(P z)⊥∥∥
1
≤
∥∥(P z)⊥αP z ‖1+‖ (P z)α(P z)⊥∥∥1 +
∥∥(P z)⊥α(P z)⊥∥∥
1
= 2
∥∥(P z)⊥αP z∥∥
1
+ δ
≤ 2 ∥∥(P z)⊥√α∥∥
2
∥∥√αP z∥∥
2
+ δ
≤ 2
√
‖(P z)⊥α(P z)⊥‖1
√
‖P zαP z‖1 + δ
= 2
√
(1− δ)δ + δ
≤ 3
√
δ.
And, ‖P zαP z −∑c P cαP c‖1 ≤ δ ≤
√
δ which yields the
desired result.
The general case now follows, since any state of CQ is
a convex combination of states that are concentrated on
a single value of C, the function ‖·‖1 is convex, and the
square root function is concave. 
3. Two-universal hash families
We make use of some standard ideas (see, e.g., section
4.6.1 in [23]). Let P,R be finite sets with |R| ≤ |P |.
Then, a set of functions D from P to R is 2-universal if
for any distinct p, p′ ∈ P , the probability that a function
F chosen uniformly at random fromD will satisfy F (p) =
F (p′) is less than or equal to 1/ |R|.
Proposition 9 Let P be a finite set and let u be a posi-
tive integer with 2u ≤ |P |. Then there exists a 2-universal
set of functions from P to Fu2 of size ≤ 4 |P |2.
Proof. Let v be such that 2v−1 < |P | ≤ 2v. Without
loss of generality, we may assume that P ⊆ F2v . Let D′
be the set of all affine endomorphisms (X 7→ aX + b) of
F2v . Fix a function T : F2v → Fu2 such that each element
of R has exactly 2u−v pre-images, and let D = T ◦ D′.
Note that |D| ≤ |D′| = (2v)2 ≤ 4 |P |2.
For any p 6= p′ and q, q′ in F2v , there is exactly one
function in D′ which maps (p, p′) to (q, q′). Thus the
distribution of (F (p), F (p′)) on P ×P is uniform when F
is chosen at random from D′, and likewise (T ◦F (p), T ◦
F (p′)) is uniform on R×R. The desired result follows.
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